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Introduction
What has Anna Pavlova got to do with the Russian Revolution of 1917? The famous ballet
dancer left Russia a few years before the revolution and never returned. However, a short film
showing Pavlova dancing at the National Theatre in Havana, Cuba, in February of 1917 has been
among the most popular Facebook post in a history reenactment project called Project ‘1917 –
Free History’ (Project 1917 2017). The project was headed by a Russian journalist named
Mikhail Zygar and a group of volunteers. During the year 2017, it reconstructed the revolution in
the form of a social networking website. Moderators created accounts for real historical
characters and interpreted 1917 through social media messages and interactions. Archival
documents, quotes and photographs provided the content. Both the project’s authors and the
audience considered Pavlova’s performance relevant to the context of the revolution.
Another reenactment project called #1917Live, launched by the Russian international
broadcaster RT, stood out in a different manner. #1917Live interpreted the Russian Revolution
via a communication network on Twitter. Arguably, the project’s most notable outcome was a
scandal regarding the suspended Twitter account of the historical UK Embassy in the Russian
Empire. British authorities complained, and Twitter agreed – #1917Live used official UK
symbols without consent.
These two examples preface my argument in this chapter – past and present controversies
reinforce each other in historical media projects, while customized experiences of history on
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social media may lead to a lower level of authenticity and higher emotional response. Decisive in
this process are the socio-political contexts wherein certain episodes of history become public.
Thus, public discussion of history via state-controlled and independent media is the subject
through which this chapter contributes to the book’s general focus on freedom of expression in
Russia. The chapter illustrates how traditional media structures in modern Russia adapt
historically sensitive narratives to the realities of social media. Both projects are variants of this
adaptation process. Mikhail Zygar, the author of Project ‘1917 – Free History’, has been a strong
critic of the Kremlin. Before starting the project, he worked as the editor-in-chief for the
oppositional TV channel Dozhd. In contrast, RT’s #1917Live originates from the opposite
political camp as part of Russian state media.
Project ‘1917 – Free History’ was launched in the fall of 2016. #1917Live started in February
2017. Throughout 2017, the two projects experimented with archival documents and social
media to recreate the events of the Russian Revolution. Commemorating the centenary in the
form of historical reenactments, each project focused in its own way on historical characters,
their experiences and records of their lives. Their shared philosophy was to replay the past as if
social media had existed a hundred years ago. As this chapter aims to show, the projects differed
in their background, technological approaches to social media and preferred target audiences.
Towards the second half of the chapter, my analysis of these projects builds on the theoretical
premises known in scholarship as the affective turn in social sciences and humanities
(O’Sullivan 2001; Hemmings 2005; Clough 2008). When applied to history and historical
reenactments, the emphasis then shifts to personal experiences and responses to the past rather
than paying attention to conventional structural questions of history – major events, institutions,
political leadership and social transformations (Agnew 2007; Landsberg 2015).
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This comparative study reflects on how current socio-political contexts and available social
media tools may be linked to questions of authenticity and emotional response (affect) in
historical reenactments. I pay attention to the language used in the projects. The language choice
indicates whether the target audiences were primarily from Russia, Russian speakers or broader
international audiences. Project ‘1917 – Free History’ originally was in Russian, but a version
was also developed in English. RT’s #1917Live was initially launched in three languages
(Russian, English and Spanish), but the project soon abandoned Russian and reduced the scope
of the Spanish versions, prioritizing the use of English.
I limit my analysis to Facebook and Twitter. While Project ‘1917 – Free History’ used VK more
actively (Wijermars 2018), only on Facebook did it maintain the versions in Russian and
English, which justified their selection for this chapter. #1917Live concentrated on Twitter. The
projects opened accounts in other social media but did not develop them as much. To account for
the participatory capacities of the projects, I consider social media likes and shares (or retweets)
as indicators of their affectivity. The chapter, therefore, integrates readings of literature on the
role of the media in historical reenactments and the hypothesized turn towards the primacy of
affect.
History in the Russian public sphere
In modern Russia, history plays a distinct political role. In recent years, celebrations of the
Victory Day marking the end of the Second World War in Europe, also known in Russia as the
end of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), have inspired a multitude of historical projects in
cinematography, art and mass media. As a rule, such projects depend on hefty government
subsidies and the prominent role of state television (Hutchings and Rulyova 2009; Lassila 2013;
Wijermars 2019).
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The projects discussed here, however, dealt with an earlier and less glorious past. The long-
lasting Russian Revolution had two major episodes. In February 1917, Emperor Nicholas II was
forced to resign, transferring power to the Provisional Government. In October, the Bolsheviks
seized power and set up a new Soviet government, triggering a civil war. At the same time,
Russia was still involved in the First World War. The poor performance of the tsarist army was
one of the harbingers of the Russian Revolution (Wildman 1980). In 1918, the First World War
ended for Russia with territorial losses, the imperial family being secretly executed and the
continuation of the civil war – none of which helped national pride.
This partly explains why the collapse of the Russian monarchy in 1917 has been a largely
neglected topic in the Russian public sphere. The mainstream Russian news media – whether
state-owned or otherwise controlled – reported on the centenary far less than they typically report
on such key episodes of the Second World War as the Victory Day, the Battle of Stalingrad or
the Siege of Leningrad. The very idea of the revolution, however, turned out to also be a
sensitive topic for the Kremlin. Scholars Rendle and Retish (2017), in their introduction to the
special issue of Revolutionary Russia, noted that people at the highest political levels of Russian
government, including President Vladimir Putin, were unfairly passive and reluctant to talk about
this historical period. Paying attention to revolutions contradicts the unifying dogmatic version
of Russian history. It was also feared that such history could inspire political opposition.
Accordingly, cultural memories about the Russian Revolution and the Second World War differ
significantly. The Revolution raised controversial feelings that impede nation consolidation.
Even more to the point, the very idea of revolution reminds the Russians of the possibility of
changing the current political system. Therefore, the state has no interest in encouraging or
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sponsoring large-scale reenactments of the time of revolution, at least for domestic audiences
(Rendle and Retish 2017).
Yet, it is impossible to escape discussions of the Russian Revolution that several generations of
Soviet people annually celebrated, mythologized and documented during the Soviet era (see
Kolonitskii 2009). For many Russians who grew up in the Soviet Union, this is still an intrinsic
part of their cultural heritage and general knowledge. It would be wrong to say then that the
centenary was entirely forgotten. It inspired a certain number of government officials, historians,
public figures, journalists and other intellectuals to revisit the events of 1917 in different formats,
including some notable examples of historical reenactments.
Historical reenactments, perhaps with the exception of some private reconstructions for the sake
of a hobby, seek to make history public and create public engagement with history. They use
archival and other historical materials in an attempt to describe the past through the eyes,
experiences and behaviour of the people who lived through such events. Theatre is perhaps the
most traditional form of reenactments. Other popular genres include living history museums,
thematic festivals, battle reenactments and performances at historical tourist destinations (Gapps
2009; McCalman and Pickering 2010; Magelssen et al. 2011).
In 2017, several initiatives were developed to present the Russian Revolution to the public.
History clubs, museums and theatres included the revolutionary theme in their events,
exhibitions and performances, often highlighting a particular moment in history: strikes, the
arrest of the emperor’s family, their dramatic evacuation to Tobolsk or the decision by the
Provisional Government to stay in the First World War in April 1917. History was addressed
through old and new documentary films screened in small-scale museum settings. The Mariinsky
Theatre experimented with a special event devoted to 1917 that included a role-playing
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performance by the popular punk and rock band Leningrad and its lead singer Sergei Shnurov. In
another theatrical performance, the Moscow Gubernsky Theatre staged a reconstruction of the
last days of the imperial family.
As for mass media attention given to the Russian Revolution, serious and accurate historical
discussions appeared more regularly in smaller-scale independent media than in the central state
media. The liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and television channel Dozhd, for example,
resisted the official low interest in the centenary by organizing numerous interviews and talk
shows with historians, political scientists and oppositional politicians. The state-controlled TV
channels Pervii Kanal and Rossiia 1 preferred fictional genres. In November 2017, they released
two television series: Trotsky and Demon of the Revolution (Demon Revoliutsii) accordingly.
Critics slammed them both for being inaccurate in the biographical details, demonizing the
revolutionaries and drawing ominous parallels with modern political dissent in Russia (Carroll
2017; Kinopoisk 2017; Yaffa 2017). In a reverse logic, the anti-corruption protests that occurred
in Russia in 2017 inspired some small-scale independent media to draw their own parallels with
the events of 1917. They even influenced Project ‘1917 – Free History’ to combine the past and
the present agendas into one interactive landscape, albeit with limited audience participation
(Wijermars 2018). In contrast, Widestedt’s (2019) analysis demonstrates that RT’s #1917Live
actively depoliticized the revolutionary protests by portraying them as random episodes
disconnected from each other and from present politics.
Apart from the traditional aspects of mediated historical reenactments – collapsing the past into
the present, the mixing of audio and visual elements, stylizations and archival aesthetics (Baron
2014; Koivunen 2016) – Project ‘1917 – Free History’ and #1917Live represented a new type of
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historical reenactment. They added yet another dimension to the genre by inviting the audience
to witness history through social media.
The two projects differed in how people could interact with them. Project ‘1917 – Free History’
concentrated most of its efforts on its main website (www.project1917.ru) and only
supplemented this core interface with accounts in social media (VK and Facebook). #1917Live
formally launched a website within RT’s domain, but deployed the bulk of its content in Twitter
feeds. The basic elements of such projects are the profile pages of historical characters and
organizations, where moderators publish messages (posts or tweets) that can include textual
information, attached images, links and hashtags. Moderators constructed the messages so that
they interacted with other characters and narratives. External participants, the audience, could
watch how the ‘live’ action unfolded simply by subscribing to selected profiles or receiving
automatic updates on certain discussion feeds. But they could also interact with the content by
commenting on and sharing it with their own social media contacts. In short, the projects not
only generated their own internal reenactment space, but were also integrated with various social
media in the same way as any other content producer on the internet.
Research shows that Twitter is more communication-oriented than Facebook (and arguably also
VK, which functions in a similar way as Facebook). Twitter is suited to and is used more often
for individual interaction with sources of information rather than for interpersonal
communication and group dynamics, for which Facebook is more appropriate (Hughes et al.
2012; Halpern et al. 2017). For historians and history enthusiasts interested in the public
dissemination of history, ‘with the goal of enlightening both the public and participants as to
conditions of life in the past’ (Cook 2004, 487), reenactments are more authentic when they
enhance social experience. For them, reenactment is a process of learning through other people
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and less through historical documents. In reenactments on social media, this becomes a question
of choosing the right platform.
The interactive features of social media provide new ways to increase public participation. What
if Vladimir Lenin could take a selfie, post it on social media and announce his plans for a strike?
His ‘contemporaries’ and modern-day followers, inside and outside Russia, would immediately
know what he was up to and be able to react, send him a message and see how he answers. Lenin
would not be real, of course, but played by someone living in the present, who studied his
biography, accessed relevant documents and dared to improvise with respect to Lenin’s social
media activities and reactions. As with any historical reenactment, accuracy and authenticity are
questions that can jeopardize a project’s appeal and success.
The authenticity of Project ‘1917 – Free History’ and #1917Live
Project ‘1917 – Free History’ aimed to connect publics and history not only to provide an
entertaining version of it, but also to invite people to experience it through genuine historical
sources. The main website for Project ‘1917 – Free History’ was designed with a functionality
mimicking social networking sites. In addition, the project copied parts of its content to actual
social media. Several hundred people who lived through 1917, some well-known and others
rarely mentioned in traditional history, were recreated as individual profiles and narratives. Links
with references to the full version of historical documents appeared in most storylines. One of
the goals was to also counter the state-controlled narrative of Russian television. The dominant
stereotype on television compared the Russian Revolution to the Arab Spring and the uprisings
in the former Soviet states, especially in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). As the televised
discourse implied, all of them received support from abroad and were not inspired by internal
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problems (Seddon 2017). The documented individual stories in Project ‘1917 – Free History’
were meant to prove this allusion wrong.
The project was a combined effort, involving the work of journalists, historians, graphic
designers and illustrators. A few dozen professionals volunteered to moderate and administer the
work. The hidden part of that effort boiled down to archival work – finding and cataloguing
original letters, memoirs, diaries and other documents from the revolutionary period. For its
creators, the project was an attempt to understand the meaning of the year 1917 across different
social classes and generations. The creators claimed that some unique documents they had
discovered would be made public for the first time. The reenactment element resided in the fact
that the project team collected archival documents, converted them into digital formats and
published them in an imaginary online community on behalf of real historical characters that
developed in real time. It meant that a document pertaining to a certain date in 1917 was released
on the same date in 2017. A novel element, however, was in connecting those processed
documents to form a coherent communication network, thus resembling modern social media
practices.
Project ‘1917 – Free History’ raised money from a variety of sponsors primarily to pay for its
technical infrastructure. The project’s website listed some 20 organizations that supported the
work. Russia’s state-owned bank Sberbank was the only financial institution on the list. Notably,
the bank had its own publicity interest in helping the project, occasionally reminding participants
that it was open and operating already at the time of the revolution. As an important financial
instrument of those unstable times, Sberbank was proudly featured in several of the project’s
reenactment plots. For example, an interactive visualization showing the inside of one of the
bank’s central offices played scenes where famous historical characters came in, waited for an
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appointment and exchanged remarks. Another major contribution came from the Russian internet
giant and popular search engine Yandex, which helped with technological solutions and hosting
capacities. The rest of the list of partner organizations included museums, libraries, archives and
publishers that helped with gaining access to and reproducing archive material.
Given RT’s connections to the Russian state, it is reasonable to believe that #1917Live must
have been part of Russia’s foreign media policy – namely, to legitimize Russian domestic and
global politics (Simons 2014, 8; Yablokov 2015). The Russian Revolution was one of the most
important events of the 20th century, one with global consequences. In a confrontation with
Western interests, it was crucial that RT exploits this topic by setting the baseline agenda for
international publics. Had RT ignored it, other foreign broadcasters could have taken over the
discussion. In that respect, making #1917Live part of RT’s global media campaign did not
contradict the low public profile of the Revolution inside official Russia. On the contrary, RT
sought to tell foreign publics that the Revolution was ‘one of the most uncertain periods of the
Russian history of the 20th century, which saw an end to the rule of the Romanov dynasty’ (RT
2016).
#1917Live chose Twitter as its main communication platform, integrated into RT’s website at
www.1917.rt.com (moved to www.1917live.red in 2018). The interaction developed around the
main account, @RT_1917, with about a hundred other accounts representing people, groups of
people and organizations. Compared to Project ‘1917 – Free History’, #1917Live was less strict
about historical authenticity, allowing fictional or not clearly attributable accounts, such as
‘student Vladimir’, ‘Kronstadt sailors’ and, of course, the network’s central mouthpiece,
@RT_1917, which served as a never-existing newspaper, the Russian Telegraph, and renamed
by the Bolsheviks Revolutionary Times.
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Project ‘1917 – Free History’ and #1917Live became two historical reenactments of a similarly
large scale. Both shared some elements of social media use and digital communication, and yet
they were essentially different in others. Comparing them, therefore, gives us a fuller picture of
how traditional media actors – an independent group of volunteers headed by journalist Mikhail
Zygar and the state-funded broadcaster RT – adapted their representations of history to the social
media environment.
The two projects demonstrated different media approaches to retelling the history of the
Revolution. Project ‘1917 – Free History’ positioned itself outside and even against the logic of
traditional media organizations that decide what to tell us and how. It delegated communicative
capacities to personified accounts. In contrast, RT’s #1917Live, while communicated through
Twitter, pursued the explicitly centralized logic of mass media. The main information hub
represented a fictional newspaper with an unambiguous account handle referring to RT. Dozens
of other accounts were grouped around @RT_1917 in a tight network. While the project utilized
hundreds of unique hashtags to help the viral spread of its messages, the ubiquitous use of the
hashtag #1917Live held the whole structure together.
Crucial for comparing the national and international scopes of such projects is the fact that
Project ‘1917 – Free History’ was originally in Russian and, with only a few months delay, a
version was then launched in English. In fact, with this international advancement of its agenda,
the project stepped into the primary domain of #1917Live. The English version received support
from the Pushkin House Foundation in London. Devoted to promoting Russian culture, the
foundation formally is autonomous and financially independent of the Russian government. It
receives donations from several British organizations that represent both the Russian diaspora
and academic institutions, such as the London School of Economics. The foundation for the most
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part helped translate Project ‘1917 – Free History’ into English and published a separate version
of it for the English-speaking public.
Project ‘1917 – Free History’ appeared more authentic than #1917Live, for it operated with
profiles representing only real historical characters and organizations. The relationship within the
social networks and especially the ‘friendship’ ties were, of course, necessary improvizations by
the moderators. For example, Project ‘1917 – Free History’ told its audience that Aleksandr
Kerensky, one of the central figures in the Provisional Government, had fifteen ‘friends’, while
Vladimir Lenin established personal friendship ties with only eight other people. Although the
moderators did not design any friendship ties between the two central characters and antagonists
of the Russian Revolution, the reenactments of their personal correspondence and official
documents were frequently cross-referenced as if they were part of a digitally cohesive group.
Such contextual links thus appeared counter-intuitive, at least with respect to modern party
politics, where ideological rivals rarely, if ever, promote the social media profiles of one another.
The reenactments presented here also departed from authentic renderings of history by collapsing
communication speed at different rates. Official documents and newspaper articles had a much
slower production circle at the beginning of the 20th century than they do today; private letters
were not exchanged as quickly as modern messaging, and they relied on postal delivery times
that were subject to frequent delays; notes and diaries remained unknown for years. The social
media imitations in these projects, however, followed a different logic of contemporary online
publishing tools: the same production speed was applied to all types of messages, which
appeared as updates in reverse chronology from the latest on top to the oldest further down the
screen.
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Beyond these questions of authenticity, there was the more intriguing issue of what it felt like to
be part of such reenactments. Project ‘1917 – Free History’ and #1917Live reconstructed social
networks of the past (still more authentic in the former case and involving more fiction in the
latter case). They built relational ties between historical characters and institutions, integrated
them into modern social media, but only the participation of real people turned them into time-
travel machines. Social networks of the past and present were conflated to trigger new
experiences of both 1917 and 2017.
The role of affect in historical reenactments
Both projects aimed to reconstruct the past by paying attention to personalities and their social
media profiles. They put the moderators and the audiences into a position where they could
experience the past through immersion in the reality of those profiles. This emphasis on the
private rather than on the public distinguishes what is called the affective turn in social theory.
This section assesses the applicability of such a vision to Project ‘1917 – Free History’ and
#1917Live.
In historiography, the affective turn means a shift in the way history appears in public (in
schools, theatres and mass media), a departure from large-scale, events-based history and well-
known documents towards more trivial details seen from new angles or through personal
experiences. The relatively new approach focusing on affects began to rapidly develop in the late
1990s. Scholars criticized previous approaches, claiming that post-structuralism, for example,
was unable to grasp bodily the materialism of human subjects, the technological mediatization of
senses and subjectivities (Clough 2008; Coole and Frost 2010). Studies of affect in
historiography (see Reddy 2006; Mikula 2015) and media research (see Papacharissi and de
Fatima Oliveira 2012; Papacharissi 2016), and their combinations (Agnew 2007; Landsberg
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2015; Koivunen 2016), followed the general developments in communication technologies. As
Alison Landsberg argues, ‘the main way in which contemporary, mass-mediated historical
production differs from academic history is in its emphasis on the mobilization of affect’ (2015,
178).
Therefore, media reinforce the affective turn. Affective thinking not only transforms the internal
logic of historical reenactments, it also opens them to various interventions. Previously,
historical reenactments for the most part attracted history enthusiasts and/or an elitist type of
audience, and they rarely targeted wider audiences. Meanwhile, several studies have shown how
reenactments organized with the help of mass media or presented through them allow for a more
popular and mass experience of history (Cook 2004; Knutsen 2016; Rymsza-Pawlowska 2017).
The use of the internet and social media for historical reenactments is still a novelty, especially
beyond applications in small-scale, clearly defined publics, such as, for instance, history classes
(McKenzie 2014). Therefore, larger projects, such as those discussed here, have drawn scholarly
attention from a number of perspectives (Hutchings and Tolz 2017; Drezov 2018; Wijermars
2018; Widestedt 2019).
What remains unexplored is how reenactment projects adjust their historical knowledge to the
socio-political  intentions of the reenactors themselves and to the purpose of achieving wider
publicity through social media. The reenactment projects discussed here used historical
documents to transform their content into messages suitable for or similar to social media
formats. This was the part where the projects initiated the reenactments but did not have full
control over them. The materialization of the past entails a public response that can be
conceptualized as affective. The reenactors and the audience are given tools to interact with
historical characters, documents or episodes by emotionally responding to them. One concrete
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form of such a practice is the omnipresent ‘like’ button, which produces the so-called ‘affective
traffic’ (van Dijck 2013, 162). Historical reenactments on Facebook and Twitter thus move
beyond the academic accounts of the past that we find in history textbooks. Therefore, historical
reenactments on social media not only involve the affective dimension on the part of the
projects’ authors and administrators, but also influence a generation of affective publics
(Papacharissi 2016) whose feelings materialize in the forms of collaboration, co-authoring and
sharing the experience of the revolution. The question is, to what extent were Project ‘1917 –
Free History’ and #1917Live indeed affective and what role did the audience play in that effort?
According to the affective model, reenactments challenge traditional academic and educational
approaches to studying and discussing history. They avoid definitive claims about past events,
immersing participants in individual lives of the past and helping them experience and
internalize that other reality and, as a result, provide a different way of learning. There are limits
to those experiences, too. Reenactments cannot escape structural constraints. They demonstrate
via the choice of historical characters a dependence on the structure of archival materials and
presentation styles that was impossible in the past.
As Agnew (2007, 301) has noted in her study of a German historical TV series, the increased
authenticity of affective reenactments collapses the time that spans the past and the present into a
single epoch; it dissolves differences that are crucial to ‘further historical understanding and
reconcile the past to the present’. Moreover, this collapse ‘implies forms of historical continuity
that are not only potentially inaccurate but also exploitable for ideological ends’ (Agnew 2007,
309). Notable in that respect is the moment, mentioned earlier, when RT created a historical
Twitter account for the UK Embassy. Its banning resonated with contemporary tensions and
confrontations in the Russia–UK relation over, among other topics, the annexation of Crimea and
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the suspected Russian influence in Brexit. It becomes difficult to distinguish between ideological
relationships of power, of who controls the discourse, as reenactments produce affects that are
not individual, but rather, social and cultural forces linked to nation-building (see Koivunen
2016).
Alexander Cook (2004, 494), in his essay on ‘The Use and Abuse of Historical Reenactment’,
proposed that the greatest benefit of reenactments does not come from their ability to retell the
known facts of history, but from their ability to encourage the public to learn something new
about their present with the help of history. This is precisely what social media’s affective
functionality enables – the co-production of reflexive moments about the meaning of
revolutionary events for one’s own national identity and imagination. Different media tools and
content may have a profound effect on the outcome of such individual investigations spread
across geographical locations.
The affectivity of Project ‘1917 – Free History’ and #1917Live on social
media
The above-mentioned theoretical points informed my approach to this study of Project ‘1917 –
Free History’ and #1917Live. In this section, I focus on what the projects published in their
social media reenactments and how the audiences reacted to those publications. I analysed how
many posts were published, how many of them were original and how many were shared, and
what were the metrics of user reactions (likes, shares and similar metrics). Thus, instead of
conducting a conventional content analysis of social media posts, I employed a different
approach to obtain a sense of how affectivity works. My main method of data collection
consisted of monitoring the projects throughout the year 2017 and choosing a shorter moment in
time to make a closer analysis of their activities with smaller samples. To secure the
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comparability of these subsamples (two retrieved from Facebook and one from Twitter,
according to the projects), I focused on the first weeks of November, which also included the
highest peak of activities on the day of the October Revolution (7 November in the modern
calendar).
In practical terms, I relied on the meta-data used by Facebook and Twitter to internally classify
content. The data are available through application programming interfaces (APIs). For example,
I distinguished between original and external content on social media. By original content, I
mean those messages that can be attributed to the projects’ own production teams, such as
Facebook posts marked as ‘added photo’, ‘added video’, ‘status update’ or linked to the projects’
websites. Similarly, original tweets were those posted by the project accounts or linked to them.
External content, however, appeared as ‘shared’ on Facebook or as a ‘retweet’ on Twitter and led
to external materials. I also compared messages that were textual only and those with added
visual elements (pictures, maps, diagrams and videos). I compared the messages based on the
numbers of shares, likes or favourites (for Twitter) they received as an indicator of affectivity.
Previous studies of historical reenactments have advanced our understanding of affects in non-
interactive forms of mass media, mainly television. The interactive nature of social media
expands the earlier theoretical framework by adding a participatory dimension to the genre. The
projects discussed here had clear strategies targeting either Russian speakers or international
English-speaking audiences, or both. The advantage of open social media data is that we can
estimate (through APIs) where those followers and participants came from. With due
reservations about the reliability of geolocation based on IP addresses, we can map the projects
geographically, and hence, reflect on the audience composition.
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In Project ‘1917 – Free History’ on Facebook, the majority of the subscribers to the Russian-
language version had IP addresses in Russia (75 per cent), followed by Ukraine (10 per cent), the
USA (4.2 per cent), Germany (2.6 per cent) and the UK (2.2 per cent). The English-language
version was the most popular in the USA (28 per cent) and the UK (22 per cent). Users from
Russia were the third largest group of subscribers (16.5 per cent). These numbers indicate that
Project ‘1917 – Free History’ had no explicit geographically confined audience. Even its version
in English attracted many users in Russia.
Nearly 6,000 unique users reacted to #1917Live’s content at @RT_1917 on 7 November. Of
those users, almost 70 per cent had self-reported geotags on their locations, which roughly
illustrates the geography of the project on that day. One-third of the users (33 per cent) who
liked, commented on or retweeted @RT_1917’s messages reported the USA or Canada as their
location. The second largest group (10 per cent) were from the UK. Russian users were a
minority group representing less than 3 per cent, which corresponds to RT’s orientation towards
international audiences. The use of English in both projects seemed to determine that at least half
of the audience was North American or British.
The affective turn thesis suggests privileging details about people’s private lives and experiences
and paying less attention to specific dates and turning points. However, the projects’ moderators,
who were perhaps too entrenched in their rigid frameworks of conventional history education,
made it clear that 7 November was a culmination of their reenactment efforts. Both projects were
most active on that day, posting and sharing stories. I have monitored what the projects did on
that day and summarized the data along with social media affective reactions (shares and likes)
in Table 6.1. The Facebook-based projects published 26 (@Project1917, in Russian) and 25
(@1917FreeHistory, in English) stories on that day. Compared to the overall outputs of 657 and
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707 posts throughout the year 2017 (3.7 posts a day), these numbers unequivocally demonstrate
the date of 7 November as important. I found a similar trend at #1917Live. The main account
@RT_1917 tweeted 139 times, including 87 original tweets and 52 retweets. The total number of
tweets and retweets on that day was more than ten times the average level from the week before
and after.
The median levels of sharing (retweeting) and liking (favourites for Twitter) in Table 6.1 reveal
the following tendencies. First, we can see that Project ‘1917 – Free History’ on Facebook had a
disproportionally higher range of differences between likes and shares, whereas for #1917Live,
those categories were closer to each other. People were less inclined to share content on
Facebook, but were quite eager to express their feelings about it. Second, given the subscription
differences between the two projects on Facebook, the active affective response (shares) to the
Russian-language version was lower. Nonetheless, it displayed a passive response in terms of the
numbers of likes per post, which was relatively similar to the English-language version.
Original content, which, by definition, constitutes the work of reenactors and should be related to
higher degrees of authenticity, played a substantial role in how the projects developed. So, for
example, the affectivity levels of the original tweets by @RT_1917 did not differ significantly
from the retweets (p = 0.145). However, tweets with images were significantly more affective
than tweets with text (p < 0.001). Facebook’s internal algorithms are known to privilege original
user posts and minimize the visibility of posts with links to external sources (DeVito 2017).
Thus, subscribers to Project ‘1917 – Free History’ had more chances to see the posts tailored for
Facebook specifically rather than those linked to the project’s website. Technically, the latter
would be what the project actually did; hence, they would be more original. In that sense,
originality played a more nuanced and intriguing role in reenactments copied to Facebook. What
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appeared on both Facebook projects as external content (50 per cent in Russian and 76 per cent
in English) were, in fact, original reenactment stories from the projects’ official websites,
whereas Facebook-specific posts were merely additions or reworked stories. As a result, both
language versions had significantly lower affectivity levels for external posts (p = 0.001 in
Russian and p = 0.22 in English).
To assess the scope of this affectivity, we can compare the projects by the audience sizes they
engaged. There are at least two ways to roughly estimate the audience size when analysing social
media pages. First, the reported numbers of subscribers to the projects’ accounts indicate their
relative popularity and potential reach. These are the so-called followers, who at some point
expressed their interest in the projects by clicking ‘like’ or ‘follow’ buttons – integral parts of
social media functionality. Subscribers receive updates from the pages or accounts they choose
to follow, but that does not mean they really continue paying attention to them or even see them
in their news feeds, where notifications from friends and other liked content compete for the
greater chance to appear on top.
<COMP: Place Table 6.1 Here>
Another way to measure the audience for the projects is to look at the numbers of users who not
only subscribed to the content but also interacted with it: like, share or comment. To obtain a
sense of that parameter, I used meta-data on user reactions to the posts published by the
Facebook projects during the period of twelve months (January to December 2017) and RT’s
Twitter project for a period of two weeks (1–14 November 2017). Statistics on user reactions can
also serve as an aggregated indicator of affectivity. The more reactions per user, the higher the
average intensity of affect. Active users are, of course, always fewer than the number of
followers who are only potential participants – not all subscribers decide to interact with the
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content they may have encountered. In this analysis, an active user differs from merely a
subscriber by the fact of having liked, shared or commented on the projects’ content at least once
during the studied period.
As Table 6.1 shows, at the time of data collection (November 2017) Project ‘1917 – Free
History’ had approximately five times more Facebook subscribers to its version in Russian than
to its English-language version and slightly fewer than the number of Twitter followers achieved
by RT’s central account @RT_1917. As for user activities, the Russian-language version of
Project ‘1917 – Free History’ had approximately 30,000 active Facebook users, or 75 per cent of
the subscriber base. The most active ten per cent of these active users had ten or more
interactions with the content. This means that the core group of users regularly involved in the
project was quite small compared to the subscriber base, and most responses to the page were not
systematic. Similar statistics for the English-language version of Project ‘1917 – Free History’
revealed over 3,000 unique users who reacted to at least one of the published stories throughout
the year (or 37 per cent of subscribers). The same criteria of taking the top ten per cent of those
users revealed at least thirteen reactions per user, which is more than the core group for the
Russian-language version.
RT’s #1917Live nominally had the largest Twitter subscription rate of the three projects. The
level of engagement is difficult to compare with the level of engagement of Facebook users,
though. The samples did not cover the same period (due to Twitter’s restrictions on data
retrieval). Twitter data only contained user ids for ‘retweets’ (analogous to sharing on Facebook)
but not for ‘favourites’ (likes). The platforms are also different in their communicative dynamics.
Nonetheless, the raw numbers on sharing and liking of the #1917Live content correlated so
strongly that we can assume the utility of using the former as an indicator of affectivity on
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Twitter. I found that during the two crucial weeks, approximately 1,300 unique users (2.2 per
cent of subscribers) reacted to the posts on @RT_1917, and the cut-off line for the most active
ten per cent of these users was four retweets.
These results mean that the Russian-language version of Project ‘1917 – Free History’ had a
larger and more affective public; more of the subscribers actually participated, even though it
could be just a one-time reaction. Fewer subscribers participated in the English-language version.
They were less likely to demonstrate affective response (likes) and, instead, more eager to share
what they saw. However, if we switch our attention to the active core group of English-language
users, their affective engagement with the content was slightly higher, though this difference
with the core group of Russian-language users was not statistically significant. Compared to both
versions on Facebook, the affectivity of #1917Live on Twitter looks much weaker.
What episodes of the historical reenactments were more affective, causing more people to like
the content and possibly triggering more diverse emotions? Facebook allows users to distinguish
between a simple ‘like’ and a number of other emotional responses, specifying whether they
‘love’, feel surprised (‘wow’), ‘sad’, ‘angry’ or are amused by (‘haha’) the content.
@Project1917 and @1917FreeHistory performed differently in this respect. The generic ‘likes’
were more common for Project ‘1917 – Free History’ in English, while the Russian version
generated a wider range of affects. The chances of a diversified emotional response were almost
twice as high for the Russian-language page as for the English-language page (p< 0.001). This
fact may be a result of the higher proportion of culturally grounded content that the project in
Russian was able to mobilize and present in the form of pastiche and collage posts. The remixing
of archival documents into demotivation posters, wordplays and historical parallels to modern
Russian contexts is difficult, if not impossible, to repeat for an international audience. This
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difference, though, could also result from different traditions of digital content production and
social media use.
Discussion
This chapter looked at three examples of social media use for historical reenactments of the
Russian Revolution of 1917. The first two were the Russian-language and English-language
versions of Project ‘1917 – Free History’ on Facebook. The third example, #1917Live, used
Twitter (@RT_1917) to target an international public in English. Project ‘1917 – Free History’
was the private initiative of a Russian journalist and it relied on volunteers and sponsorship.
#1917Live was a state-run project, part of the global media operations of the Russian foreign
broadcaster RT. Therefore, these projects had partially overlapping target audiences, bridging as
they did Russian domestic and global international domains. They also used two different
communicative platforms as part of their reenactments, which complicates comparisons but
broadens our understanding of their strategies. The projects displayed opposite approaches in
terms of how historical reenactments could be adapted to social media – centred around one key
communicator (The Russian Telegraph, or @RT_1917 on Twitter) or more evenly distributed
between multiple historical characters. The observed structural differences reflected the socio-
political contexts of their production. Practices of the authoritative government offices can be
seen in how RT’s project favoured an institutional perspective over an individual one. In
contrast, the civic format of Project ‘1917 – Free History’ presupposed reliance on volunteers
and sponsors.
Analysis of the projects’ Facebook and Twitter practices (their content, user reactions and
communicative patterns) provides mixed evidence in support of affective theory (a shift from
structural and events-based history towards the primacy of affect and personal experience). The
24
projects discussed here were driven by a conventional vision of the Russian Revolution. The
natural increase in public interest of particular events and characters is a sign of a traditional
knowledge of history. It seems the projects explicitly planned peak attention periods, with more
posts and formats mobilized to reconstruct a few key dates. Only with such knowledge could the
audience approach more personified narratives and trace individual stories. The state-run RT’s
project was slightly more conventional in its use of an institutional framework than was the
independent Project ‘1917 – Free History’.
The results discussed in this chapter highlight the effect of blurring geographical and social
boundaries, mixing national and international audiences, which may be associated with reduced
affective capacities in some cases. The projects differed significantly in how they communicated
history, what primary publics they were targeting and what affective reactions they sought to
provoke. The choice of Russian did not mean that the audience was limited to people in the
Russian Federation. Facebook, as the leading global social media platform, makes such projects
attractive to other nations with large numbers of Russian speakers, Ukraine for instance, which
might well have contributed to a different result than had VK, the Russian analogue of Facebook,
been used instead, which Ukraine banned from use in its territory in May 2017. The choice by
@RT_1917 to use English on Twitter and by @1917FreeHistory to use it on Facebook
determined that nearly half their publics came from the USA, the UK and Canada, people whose
experience with reenactments of the Russian Revolution differs significantly from that of the
Russian speakers. Furthermore, the social media presence of the projects was only part of their
overall publicity. That was the case especially for Project ‘1917 – Free History’, which included
much more content and more activities concentrated on the official website. As it turned out, my
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personal communication with project administrators (on Facebook on 18 September 2017)
revealed that updating the Facebook pages was not so important for them.
While social media neglect national geographical and political boundaries, they at least partially
retain linguistic barriers. The specificity of topics brought up by the projects discussed here
seemingly transformed national publics into publics of different cultural and linguistic domains.
It is, therefore, essential to take into account that historical knowledge reproduced via social
media carries varying affective capacities inside and outside their contextual reference points,
historical Russia in our case. At the beginning of 20th century, it was the revolutionary turmoil
and the civil war that forced an initial wave of several million Russians to immigrate to other
countries; those numbers have multiplied since then as a consequence of other dramatic
developments. Descendants of those people may well constitute a substantial part of the
international audience drawn to reenactments of the Russian Revolution.
To conclude, I would like to return to the example of Anna Pavlova and the question that served
as the starting point for this chapter. Why was Anna Pavlova mentioned in one of the projects
reenacting the Russian Revolution of 1917? Why was this episode so powerful and affective in
terms of the public reactions it caused? The chapter hints at one plausible explanation. By the
time of the revolution, Anna Pavlova was already a world-famous ballet dancer. A century ago,
this fact did not automatically mean, as would be the case now, that there were numerous
recordings and visual evidence of her career. In fact, there are surprisingly few archival
documents about her. Watching her dancing in Havana, in a 14-second, black-and-white film of
poor quality and with no audio, around the time of the February Revolution, became an event on
its own, something that both the reenactors and their publics appreciated. Pavlova’s reputation as
a revolutionary in the ballet technique had nothing to do with the political revolution in Russia in
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1917. On a deeper cultural level, however, Pavlova became a symbol. She symbolizes those
talented and successful young people who were welcomed abroad but who did not see as bright a
future in their home country. In an affective historical perspective, it does not matter that she left
Russia in 1912, before the so-called first wave of emigration when up to two million proponents
of Imperial Russia fled the revolutionary and civil war turmoil. What matters is that modern
publics extrapolate those historical details into their own experience of the present.
Table 6.1 Social media statistics for the three historical reenactment projects on 7 November
2017
Project “1917 – Free History” #1917Live
Account name @Project1917 @1917FreeHistory @RT_1917
Language Russian English English
Platform Facebook Facebook Twitter
Subscribers 40,000 8,000 58,000
Posts 26 25 139
Shares* 11 6 27
Likes* 94 20 37
*median levels.
References
Agnew, Vanessa 2007. “History’s Affective Turn: Historical Reenactment and its Work in the
Present.” Rethinking History 11, no. 3: 299–312.
Baron, Jaimie. 2014. The Archive Effect: Found Footage and the Audiovisual Experience of
History. New York: Routledge.
Carroll, Oliver. 2017. “Russian State-run TV Marks Revolution’s Centenary with Surprise Series




Clough, Patricia T. 2008. “The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia and Bodies.”
Theory, Culture & Society 25, no. 1: 1–22.
Cook, Alexander. 2004. “The Use and Abuse of Historical Reenactment: Thoughts on Recent
Trends in Public History.” Criticism 46, no. 3: 487–496.
Coole, Diana, and Samantha Frost. 2010. New Materialisms: Ontology. Agency, and Politics.
Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
DeVito, Michael A. 2017. “From Editors to Algorithms: A Values-based Approach to
Understanding Story Selection in the Facebook News Feed.” Digital Journalism 5, no. 6:753–
773.
Drezov, Kyril. 2018. “Project 1917 and RT: The Russian Revolution in the Age of Facebook and
Twitter.” Journal of Global Faultlines 4, no. 2: 163–166.
Gapps, Stephen. 2009. “Mobile Monuments: A View of Historical Reenactment and Authenticity
from Inside the Costume Cupboard of History.” Rethinking History 13, no. 3:395–409.
Halpern, Daniel, Sebastián Valenzuela, and James E. Katz. 2017. “We Face, I Tweet: How
Different Social Media Influence Political Participation through Collective and Internal
Efficacy.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 22, no. 6: 320–336.
Hemmings, Clare. 2005. “Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn.” Cultural
Studies 19, no. 5: 548–567.
Hughes, David John, Moss Rowe, Mark Batey, and Andrew Lee. 2012. “A Tale of Two Sites:
Twitter vs. Facebook and the Personality Predictors of Social Media Usage.” Computers in
Human Behavior 28, no. 2: 561–569.
Hutchings, Stephen, and Natalia Rulyova. 2009. “Commemorating the Past/Performing the
Present: Television Coverage of the Second World War Victory Celebrations and the
(de)Construction of Russian Nationhood.” In The Post-Soviet Russian Media: Conflicting
Signals, edited by Birgit Beumers, Stephen Hutchings and Natalia Rulyova, 137–155.
London: Routledge.
Hutchings Stephen, and Vera Tolz, V. 2017. “Retweeting History: RT, the 1917 Revolution
Anniversary and the Global Media Landscape.” Paper presented at Transnational Russian
Studies Symposium, Durham University 14–16 September 2017.
28
Kinopoisk. 2017. “‘Nenauchnaia fantastika’: Istoriki o serialakh ‘Demon revoliutsii’ i
‘Trotskii’.” Kinopoisk.ru, 10 November. https://www.kinopoisk.ru/article/3064991/
Knutsen, Ketil. 2016. “A History Didactic Experiment: The TV Series Anno in a Dramatist
Perspective.” Rethinking History 20, no. 3:454–468.
Koivunen, Anu. 2016. “Affective Historiography: Archival Aesthetics and the Temporalities of
Televisual Nation-Building.” International Journal of Communication 10: 5270–5283.
Kolonitskii, Boris. 2009. “Russian Historiography of the 1917 Revolution: New Challenges to
Old Paradigms?.” History & Memory 21, no. 2: 34–59.
Landsberg, Alison. 2015. Engaging the Past: Mass Culture and the Production of Historical
Knowledge. New York: Columbia University.
Lassila, Jussi. 2013. “Witnessing War, Globalizing Victory.” In Memory, Conflict and Social
Media: Web Wars in Post-Soviet States, edited by Ellen Rutten, Julie Fedor and Vera
Zvereva, 215–227. New York: Routledge.
Magelssen, Scott, Rhona Justice-Malloy, Leigh Clemons, Catherine H. Hughes, Kimberly Tony
Korol-Evans, and Lindsay Adamson Livingston. 2011. Enacting History. Tuscaloosa: The
University of Alabama Press.
McCalman, Iain, and Paul A. Pickering. 2010. Historical Reenactment: From Realism to the
Affective Turn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
McKenzie, Brian A. 2014. “Teaching Twitter: Re-enacting the Paris Commune and the Battle of
Stalingrad.” The History Teacher 47, no. 3: 355–372.
Mikula, Maja. 2015. “Historical Re-enactment: Narrativity, Affect and the Sublime.” Rethinking
History 19, no. 4: 583–601.
O’Sullivan, Simon. 2001. “The Aesthetics of Affect: Thinking art beyond Representation.”
Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 6, no. 3: 125–135.
Papacharissi, Zizi. 2016. “Affective Publics and Structures of Storytelling: Sentiment, Events
and Mediality.” Information, Communication & Society 19, no. 3: 307–324.
Papacharissi, Zizi, and Maria de Fatima Oliveira. 2012. “Affective News and Networked
Publics: The Rhythms of News Storytelling on# Egypt.” Journal of Communication 62, no. 2:
266–282.
Project 1917. 2017. “Anna Pavlova in Havana.” Project ‘1917 – Free History’ on Facebook, 13
February. https://www.facebook.com/1790312207886282_1822130441371125.
29
Reddy, William M. 2006. The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rendle, Matthew, and Aaron Benyamin Retish. 2017. “The ‘Lessons’ of 1917.” Revolutionary
Russia 30, no. 1: 1–5.
RT. 2016. “#1917LIVE: Relive the Russian Revolution as it Happened with RT’s unique Twitter
Project,” 31 December. https://www.rt.com/news/372353-russia-1917-revolution-news/.
Rymsza-Pawlowska, Malgorzata J. 2017. History Comes Alive: Public History and Popular
Culture in the 1970s. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
Seddon, Max. 2017. “Like, Share, Tweet: Social Media Meets the Russian Revolution.”
Financial Times, 10 March. https://www.ft.com/content/c270e004-04b4-11e7-ace0-
1ce02ef0def9.
Simons, Greg. 2014. “Russian Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Structure, Means and
Message.” Public Relations Review 40, no. 3: 440–449.
Van Dijck, José. 2013. The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Widestedt, Kristina. 2019. “Breaking News from Petrograd, 1917: Remediated Revolution as
Popular History.” In Screening Protest: Visual Narratives of Dissent across Time, Space and
Genre, edited by Alexa Robertson, 230–247. London: Routledge.
Wijermars, Mariëlle. 2018. “Project ‘1917 – Free History’: Reliving the Russian Revolution in
the Digital Age.” Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media
(digitalicons.org), no. 18: 45–65.
Wijermars, Mariëlle. 2019. Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia: Television, Cinema and
the State. London: Routledge.
Wildman, Allan K. 1980. The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the
Soldiers’ Revolt (March–April 1917). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Yablokov, Ilya. 2015. “Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of
Russia Today (RT).” Politics 35, no. 3–4:301–315.
Yaffa, Joshua. 2017. “Putin’s Russia Wrestles with the Meaning of Trotsky and Revolution.”
The New Yorker, 7 November. https://www.newyorker.com/sections/news/putins-russia-
wrestles-with-the-meaning-of-trotsky-and-revolution.
